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ABSTRACT
Core existence results are proved for exchange economies with an infinite dimensional commodity
space. In particular, the commodity space may be any ordered Hausdorff linear topological space, and
agents' preferences need not be transitive, complete, monotone or convex; preferences may even be
interdependent. Under these assumptions a quasi equilibrium may not exist.
t
1
The Core of an Economy
Without Ordered Preferences
Nicholas C. Yannelis*
1. Introduction
During the last decade, contributions in consumer theory [e.g., Son-
nenschein (1971), Shafer (1974) and Kim-Richter (1986)] and contri-
butions in equilibrium theory [e.g., Mas-Colell (1974), Gale-Mas-Colell
(1975), Shafer-Sonnenschein (1975), Borglin-Keiding (1976), McKenzie
(1981), and Yannelis-Prabhakar (1983)] have shown that the transitiv-
ity axiom is not only a restrictive assumption but unnecessary as well.
In fact, very general competitive equilibrium existence results have been
obtained for finite economies where agents' preferences need not be or-
dered, i.e., need not be transitive or complete (therefore, need not be
representable by utility functions), and may be interdependent. These
existence results for the competitive equilibrium have been further gen-
eralized to economies with infinitely many commodities [see for instance
Mais-Colell (1986) or Yannelis-Zame (1986) among others]. Thus, signif-
icant progress ha^ been made on the task of establishing very general
conditions for the existence of a competitive equilibrium.
The core is an alternative solution concept which has been widely
used in game theory and by extension in general equilibrium analysis. It
is still not known whether or not core existence results can be obtained
The results of this paper were obtained in 1984. The present version
is virtually identical to the Discussion paper No. 214, June 1985, University
of Minnesota. The minor changes are due to suggestions made by Charles
Holly to whom I am very thankful. It should be noted that Atsumi Kajii
has recently obtained a-core existence results for normal form games without
ordered preferences.
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at the level of generality established for competitive equilibrium existence
theorems.
The first core existence result for an economy was proved in Scarf
(1967, 1971). He required agents' preferences to be transitive and com-
plete. Border (1984) recently generalized this result to allow for pref-
erences which need not be transitive or complete. Both authors obtain
their results for economies with a finite dimensional commodity space,
and follow a common argument: First, they establish that the core of
a balanced non-side payment game is nonempty; and second, they show
the nonemptiness of the core of an economy by showing that the game
derived from an economy is balanced.^
Recently, several nonexistence core results have been given for infi-
nite dimensional commodity spaces [see for instance Araujo (1985) and
Mas-Colell (1986)]. In particular, these authors have shown by means
of counter-examples that in an infinite dimensional commodity spaxie,
where agents' preferences are representable by very well-behaved util-
ity functions, one can not necessarily even expect individually rational
Pareto optimal allocations to exist. Therefore, the question is raised un-
der what conditions can core existence results be obtained in an infinite
dimensional commodity space. The purpose of this paper is to show that
in any ordered Hausdorff linear topological space, core allocations exist
under very mild assumptions. In particular, agents' preferences need not
be ordered, monotone or nonsaturated. Indeed, under these assumptions
even a quasi-equilibrium need not exist. Moreover, we show that in any
ordered Hausdorff linear topological space, individually rational Pareto
optimal allocations exist, even if preferences are interdependent and may
not be ordered, monotone or nonsaturated.
It may be instructive to comment on the technical aspects of the
It should be noted that a different proof of Scarf's result has been given
in Shapley (1973). In particular Shapley provides an extension of the Sperner
Lemma which is used to obtain a generalized version of the Knzister-Kuratowski-
Mazurkiewicz (K-K-M) theorem known in the literature as K-K-M-S. By means
of the K-K-M-S theorem Shapley proves that the core of a balanced game is
nonempty. Here we must note that an elegant proof of the K-K-M-S theo-
rem was recently given by Ichiichi (1981), by using the coincidence theorem of
Fan (1969).
paper. Although the arguments of Scarf (1967, 1971) and Shapley (1973)
are baised on finite dimensional results, Border's (1984) proof is bcised on
an infinite dimensional fixed point result of Fan (1969). At first glance,
it seems that Border's arguments might be extended to cover infinite di-
mensional commodity spaces; unfortunately, a careful examination of his
proof indicates that this is not possible. The problem arises from the fact
that the convex hull of an upper-semicontinuous (u.s.c.) correspondence
need not be u.s.c. when the dimensionality of the commodity space is
infinite [see Schaefer (1971, exercise 27, p. 72)]. Consequently, in order to
prove the nonemptiness of the core for an economy with infinitely many
commodities and without ordered preferences different arguments than
the ones used by Scarf, Shapley and Border seem to be needed. In partic-
ular, following Bewley's (1972) ideas we will prove an infinite dimensional
core existence result by considering its trace in finite dimensions.
However, a different approach is adopted to prove that with interde-
pendent preferences individually rational Pareto optimal allocations ex-
ist. In particular, the main mathematical tool that we use is an existence
of maximal elements result which is a corollary of either the Knaster-
Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz (K-K-M) Lemma as extended by Fan (1962)
or the Browder (1968) fixed point theorem. In fact, we wiU show that
these two remarkable technical theorems turn out to be equivalent in the
sense that each one can be derived from the other. It should be noted that
the idea of using majcimal elements results to prove optima goes back to
Debreu (1959, p. 92). The same idea was also used in Hildenbrand (1974,
Theorem 3, p. 230) and Berninghaus (1977, Theorem 1, p. 283). However,
the assumption that preferences aje transitive and complete and conse-
quently representable by utility functions is crucial to their arguments. It
turns out, that allowing simultaneously, preferences to be nonordered and
the dimensionality of the commodity space to be infinite, rather powerful
fixed point results seem to be needed. It is exactly for this reason that
we make use of the theorems of Fan (1962) and Browder (1968).
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 contains
some notation and definitions. Section 3 shows the equivalence between
the K-K-M Lemma as extended by Fan and the Browder fixed point
theorem. The main results of the paper, i.e., core existence theorems, are
stated in Section 4 and their proofs are given in Section 5. In Section 6
we discuss some pathological examples known in the literature. Finally,
some concluding remarks are given in Section 7.
2. Notation and Definitions
2.1 Notation.
2"* denotes the set of all subsets of A.
con A denotes the convex hull of the set A.
R^ denotes the £-fold product of the set of real numbers R.
I^l denotes the number of elements in the set 5.
If : X —»^ 2^ is a correspondence, </>|^ denotes the restriction of (f) to A,
i.e., <^U : A - 2^.
denotes the empty set.
\ denotes the set theoretic subtraction,
int A denotes the interior of A.
IfX is a linear topological space, its dual is the space X* of all continuous
linear functionals on X.
"2.2 Definitions. Let X and Y be two topological spaces. Let
(^ : X ^^ 2^ be a set-valued function (or correspondence). The set-valued
function 4>~'^ : Y ^ 2^ defined by 4>~^{y) = {x e X : y e (l>{x)} is
called the lower section of 0. We say that <f> : X —*^ 2^ has open lower
sections if for each y E Y the set 4>~^{y) = {x G X : y 6 4^{x)} is open
in X. A binary relation 9 on X is a subset of X X X. We read x7y as
"x is strictly preferred to y." Define the correspondence P : X —> 2"^ by
P(x) = {y G X : y^x}. We call P a preference correspondence^ and P{x)
denotes its upper section and P~^{y) its lower section. The set-valued
function P : X ^^ 2''^ has an open graph if the set {{x,y) G X X X :
y G P{x)} is open in X x X. Moreover, P : X —» 2^ is said to be lower
semicontinuous if the set {x G X : P(x) D F 7^ 0} is open in X for every
open subset V of X. If there exists x* G X such that P{x*) = we say
that X* is a maximal element in X.
3. The K-K-M-F Lemma and the
Browder Fixed Point Theorem
3.1 Theorems. Fan (1962) extended the powerful Knaster-Kura-
towski-Ma^urkiewicz (K-K-M) theorem from a Euclidean space to Haus- i
m dorff linear topological spaces. Another simple but powerful fixed point
theorem wa^ proved by Browder (1968). Both results, in addition to
their applications in mathematics, have recently proved extremely use-
ful in economics. In fact, they have become the main technical tools to
prove the existence of maximal elements ajid equilibria in linear topologi-
cal spaces of arbitrary dimension. As a consequence, generalizations of the
results of Debreu (1952), Sonnenschein (1971), Mas-Colell (1974), Gale-
Mas-Colell (1975), and Shafer-Sonnenschein (1975) have been obtained
[see for instance, Borglin-Keiding (1976), Yannelis-Prabhakar (1983), and
Toussaint (1984)]. Since these two theorems will be the main mathemat-
ical tools used in the sequel, it is of interest to know the relationship
between them. The purpose of this section is to show that Fan's gener-
alization of the K-K-M theorem (called here K-K-M-F) theorem) can be
! easily derived from Browder's fixed point theorem and that the Browder
fixed point theorem can be easily derived from the K-K-M-F theorem.
Therefore one may consider these two results cls equivalent.
The K-K-M-F theorem proved in Fan (1962) is stated below:
Theorem 3.1 (K-K-M-F). Let X be an arbitrary convex set in a
Hausdorff linear topological space Y . For each x 6 X , let F{x) be a
closed set in Y such that the following two conditions are satisfied:
(i) the convex hull of any finite subset {xj, . .
.
, x^} ofX is contained in
Ur=i ^i^i)> fl"^
(ii) F{x) is compact for at least one x £ X.
Then n.ex ^(^) ^ ^-
We now state Browder's (1968) fixed point theorem.
Theorem 3.2 (Browder). Let X be a compact, convex, nonempty
subset of a Hausdorff linear topological space Y and cj) : X -^ 2^ be a
correspondence such that:
(1) 4>{x) is nonempty for all x £ X
,
(2) <f>{x) is convex for all x G X
,
(3) for each y £ X, the set <l>~^{y) = {x £ X : y e 4>{x)} is open in X,
i.e., 4> has open lower sections.
Then there exists x* £ X such that x* G <t>{^*)-
3.2 Proof of the K-K-M-F Theorem via Brow-
der's Fixed Point Theorem. Since F{x) is closed in Y for
each X £ X and compact for at least one x G -X", it suffices to prove that
P|"_j F{Xi) ^ for every subset {x^, . . . , x^} of X. Suppose otherwise,
i.e., nr=i -^(^t) — ^ ^^^ some finite subset {xi,...,x„} of X. Let A
be the finite dimensional simplex spanned by the finite set {xj, . .
.
, x^}.
Since the topology induced on any finite dimensional subspace ofY by the
topology of Y coincides with the Euchdean topology, A is homeomorphic
to a Euclidean ball (Kelley and Namioka, 1963, Theorem 7.3, p. 59). De-
fine the correspondence ifj : A —* 2^ hy ip{x) = {y G A : x ^ ^{v)}- Then
for each x G A, ip{x) is nonempty. Indeed, at leaist one x^, (1 < z < n) is in
V'(x), for otherwise x G 0?=! -^(^t)» ^^^ ^° 0?=! -^(^t) ¥^ ^- Notice that
for each j/ G A, i>~^{y) = {x G A : y G 'tp{x)} = A\{xGA:xG F{y)}.
Observe that {x G A : x G F{y)} = A D F{y), and this is a closed set
in A. Hence, for each ?/ G A the set i/'~^(t/) is open in A. Define the
correspondence : A ^- 2^ by 4>{x) = conV'(a^) for all x G A. Then,
(f>{x) is convex and nonempty for all x G A. Furthermore, by Lemma 5.1
in Yannelis-Prabhakar (1983) the set <l>~^{y) = {x G A : y G <^(a:)} is
open in A for each y G A. Consequently, the correspondence <^ : A -^ 2^^
satisfies all the assumptions of Theorem 3.2. Hence, there exists x* G A
such that X* G 4>{x*) = conil;{x*). But, x* G conil>{x*) implies that
there exist points t/j, . .
. , y^ in A and real numbers a^, . . . , a^, a^ > 0,
(1 < j < m), j2T=i S' - ^' ^^^^ ^^^^ ^* - l^^i s^i ^^^ yj ^ '^i^")
for all J, a contradiction to assumption (i). Indeed, by assumption (i),
for any arbitrary collection of points {yi,...,T/^} out of X, we have
that con{yi,...,y^} C \JT=i^{yi)- Thus, if x* G con{yi, . . . ,y^}, then
X* G (Jill ^iVi) which implies that x* G ^^(y,) for at least one i. The
above contradiction establishes that, 0?=! -^(^t) 7^ 0» ^'^^ ^^^^ completes
the proof of the K-K-M-F theorem.
3.3 Proof of Browder's Fixed Point Theorem via
the K-K-M-F Theorem. Suppose otherwise, i.e., for all
X G X, X ^ 4>{x). Let for each y e X, F{y) = X \ 4>~^{y). Since by
assumption (3) for each y ^ X^ 4>~^{y) is open in X, it follows that for
each y E X, F(y) is closed in X and obviously closed in Y since X is
a compact subset of Y. Moreover, F(y) is compact for each y £ X
.
It is easy to see that for any arbitrary set of points {y^, . . . ,y„} C X, .
we have that con{yj, . .
. ,y^} C UTrii ^iVi)- ^'^^ otherwise, there exists 11
> X G con{yi,. ..,y„} and x ^ (J|*_j
i^(yj) which implies that x G </'~^(yi)
for all i or y^ E </>(a;) for all i and therefore x G con{yj, . . . ,y^} c
con<^(x) = 4>{x)^ a contradiction to z ^ </>(2;) for all z G X. Hence,
by Theorem 3.1 flj^ex ^iv) t^ 0- Let 2 G flyeA- ^(2/)- Then for all y G X,
2 ^ <p~^{y) which implies that <f>(z) = 0, for some 2 G X. But this contra-
dicts assumption (1). Therefore there exist x* £ X such that x* G 4>{x'*),
and the proof of the Browder theorem is now complete.
3.4 Existence of Maximal Elements, it is easy to check
that Browder's fixed point theorem is equivalent to the following existence
of maximal elements result.
Theorem 3.3. LetX be a nonempty, compact, convex subset of a Haus-
dorff linear topological space Y and P : X —*^ 2^ be a preference corre-
spondence such that:
(i) X i P{x) for allx e X
(ii) P{x) is convex for all x £ X
(Hi) P has open lower sections.
Then there exists x* £ X such that P{x*) = 0.
Hence, we can reach the following conclusion:
K-K-M-F ^ Browder Theorem
<^ Existence of Maximal Elements Theorem.
A direct consequence of the K-K-M-F or Browder theorems is the fol-
lowing result, whose proof can be found in Yannelis and Prabhakar (1983
p. 239, Theorem 5.1).
Theorem 3.4. LetX be a nonempty, compact, convex subset of a Haus-
dorff linear topological space and 4> : X -^ 2^ be a correspondence having
open lower section satisfying the condition that x ^ con (t>{x) for all x £ X
.
Then there exists x* £ X such that 4>{x*) = 0.
By means of Theorem 3.4 one can obtain the following Corollary
[see Yannelis and Prabhakar (1983, p. 240, Corollary 5.1)] which is a gen-
eralized version of a result of Borglin-Keiding (1976, Corollary 1, p. 314).
We first need to introduce a definition.
Definition 3.1. Let X be a subset of a linear topological space. A
correspondence (f) : X —*^ 2^ is said to be of class >C, if
(i) X ^ con <i){x) for all x £ X
,
(ii) (j) has open lower sections.
Let V' • -X" —> 2^ be a correspondence. The correspondence 4>^ : X —^
2^ is an L^majorant of ^ at x if </>^ is of class Jl and there is an open
neighborhood of x denoted by N^ such that for all 2 G N^, ip{z) C <f>xi^)-
The correspondence -0 • -^ -^ 2^ is H,- majorized if for each x ^ X such
that il){x) 7^ 0, there is an >C-majorant of tl) at x.
Corollary 3.1. Let X be a nonempty, compact, convex subset of a
Hausdorff linear topological space and </> : X —»^ 2^ be an Ji, -majorized
correspondence. Then there exists x* £ X such that 4>{x*') — 0.
By means of the above Corollajy we will prove Theorem 4.1. We
would like to emphcisize the fact that Corollary 3.1 is a consequence of
the Theorems of K-K-M-F and Browder. Moreover, it wcls pointed out
in Borglin-Keiding (1976) that Corollary 3.1 yields an extension of the
Kakutani fixed point to Hausdorff locally convex linear topological spaces.
With those preliminary mathematical results out of the way we now turn
to our core existence theorems.
4. The Main Results
4.1 The Economy. We formalize the notion of an exchange
economy in the usual way. Let / = {l,...,iV} be a finite set of agents.
For each i G /, let X^ be a nonempty subset of an ordered Hausdorff
linear topological space L. By an exchange economy with N agents and
a commodity space L (or simply an economy in L) we mean the set
£ = {{X^^ P^, eJ : i = 1, . .
.
, iV} of triples where,
(a) X^ is the consumption set of agent i\
(b) Pj : X —> 2^ (where X = nt€/^«) ^^ ^^^ preference correspondence
of agent i;
(c) e^ is the initial endowment of agent i, where e, 6 X^ for all i G /.
An allocation is a vector x = (x^, . .
.
,
x^) G X = Yii^i ^i- -^^ ^^^'
cation x is said to be feasible if Yliei^i ~ Y^iei^i' Denote by F the set
c
iof all feasible allocations, i.e., F = {x ^ X : X^.G/^f — Xlte/^t)- Notice
that we have allowed for interdependent preferences. In this framework
y G Fiix) means that agent i strictly prefers the allocation y to x. More
simply one may define P,- : X —» 2^ by P^{xi,. . . ,Xj^) = {y e X :
4.2 The a-Core. If 5 C / then {y^,x^\^) denotes the vector z
in X such that:
^
^
r y.- if i G 5
^' ~
I a: • if i ^ 5.
An a- core allocation of £ is a vector x = (arj, . .
.
, Xj^) £ X such that:
(i) X £ F, and
(ii) it is not true that there exist S C I and (y,)jg5 E Hfes ^i such that
HiesVi = EiGS^i'^^^ {y^,z^^) e Pi(xi,...,z;v) for alii G 5 and
for any z G Ui^s ^.' Ei^s ^. = E.-^s ^i-
In other words an a-core allocation for the economy 8, must satisfy
two conditions. First it must be fezisible and secondly, no coalition of
agents can redistribute their initial endowments and make all its members
better off, once the complementary coalition chooses to redistribute its
initial endowment. For a game in normal form, the notion of a-core was
introduced in Aumann (1964). It was also used by Scarf (1971) who
proved the nonemptiness of the a-core for an n-person game with a finite
dimensional strategy space, where each agent's preferences were assumed
to be transitive, complete, and continuous.
The set of all a-core allocations for the economy 8, is denoted by C(£).
4.3 The Extreme a-Core. If i G /, then {yi,z^') denotes the
vector w m X such that:
r y • if j = i
An allocation x G X is said to be individually rational if:
(i) X G -F, and
(ii) for all i G /, it is not true that e G Fi{x).
'
An allocation x G A" is said to be Pareto optimal if:
(i) X £ F, and
(ii) there is no y G i^ such that y G Pi{x) for all i G /.
An extreme a-core allocation of £ is a vector x = (x^,...,!^)
€
Yliei-^i w^c^ satisfies individual rationality and Paxeto optimality.
Denote by Cg(£) the set of all extreme a-core allocations for the
economy t. Notice that the concept of extreme a-core allocations taJces
into account only two extreme coalitions, i.e., the grant coalition and
the coalitions of one agent alone. Therefore, it is clear that the set of
all extreme a-core allocations for £ is bigger than the set of all a-core
allocations for £, i.e., C(£) C Cg(£). However, it is easy to see that in a
two person economy, i.e., when \I\ = 2, C(£) = Gg(£).
Finally, if preferences are "selfish," i.e., P,- : X,- —> 2^' is defined by
P^.(Xj.) = {y^ G X,- : yjT,x,}, we will call an individually rational Pareto
optimal allocation, an extreme core allocation.
4.4 The Selfish Core. Let £ = {(X,-,p.,eJ : i = i,...,A^}
be an exchange economy, where P- : X- —^ 2^* is defined by P,(x,) =
{y,- E Xj : y-y^x^}. Notice that preferences are not interdependent. In
this framework we may define the notion of selfish core or simply core a^
follows:
A selfish core (or core) allocation of £ is a vector x = (xj, . .
.
, x^) G
X such that:
(i) X G P, and
(ii) it is not true that there exist S C I and (j/,)ig5 G Hies^t such that
T^iesVi = E.-6S^- ^n^ Vi ^ ^ii^i) for aU z G 5.
The above notion of core is the one extensively used in equilibrium
analysis. In fact, this is the notion of core used recently in Border (1984)
as well. Denote by Cj(£) the set of all selfish core allocations for £.
4.5 Theorems. Before we state our two main results we will need
the following definition.
Definition 4.1. A Hausdorff topology t , on an ordered Hausdorff linear
topological space L, will be called compatible if:
(a) T is weaker than the Hausdorff topology of L;
(b) T is a vector space topology (i.e., the vector space operations on L
are continuous in the topology t);
(c) all order intervals [0, j/] = {2 G I- : < z < y} in L are r-compact.
Theorem 4.1. Let £ = {(X,-,P,, ej : z G /} be an exchange economy
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ii
\ m in L, where L is endowed with the compatible topology t, satisfying for
each i £ I the following assumptions:
(4-i)
^i = L'^ t (^'^ denotes the positive cone of L),
(4.2) X ^ con Pi{x) for all x e X
,
(4-3) Pi has T-open lower sections, i.e., for each y £ X the set {x £ X :
y G Pi{x)} is T-open in X.
Then there exists an extreme a-core allocation of t, i.e., Ce(£) 7^ 0.
Theorem 4.2. Let £ = {(Xi,P^,e,) : i £ 1} be an exchange economy
in L, where L is endowed with the compatible topology r, satisfying for
each i £ I the following assumptions:
(4.4) Xi = Z+,
(4.5) X,- ^ conP,(x,) for all x- G X^,
(4-6) Pi has a r-open graph, i.e., the set {(z,-,?/,) G X^xX,- : y- £ Pii^i)}
is T-open in Xj X X^.
Then there exists a selfish core allocation of t, i.e., Cs(£) 7^ 0.
Corollary 4.1. Let £ = {(X,, P,, ej : i £ 1} be an exchange economy
in L, satisfying the following assumptions:
(4-V Xi is a nonempty, convex, compact subset of L,
(4.8) X ^ con P{x) for all x £ X,
(4-9) Pi has open lower sections.
Then there exists an extreme a-core allocation of E, i.e., Cg(£) ^ 0.
Corollary 4.2. Since for I = {1,2}, e(£) = e^{E) it follows from
Theorem 4.1 that Q{E) 7^ 0.
Remark 4.1. Notice that if in Theorem 4.1 and Corollary 4.1 we had
selfish preferences, i.e., P,- : Xj — 2^' the arguments in the proofs (see
Section 5) remain unaffected. In fact, define Pi : X ^^ 2^ hy Pi{x) =
Pi{xi) X Ylj^iXj, then the proofs go through with no modification.
4.6 Discussion of the Assumptions. Let us now discuss
the assumptions in Theorems 4.1 and 4.2.
First notice that (4.1) is identical with (4.4), and (4.2) is essentially
m the same with (4.5). Assumption (4.1) is quite standard in equilibrium
W theory and needs no explanation. Assumption (4.2) is a very weak form
11
of convexity of the upper section. It was first introduced by Shafer-
Sonnenschein (1975). Notice that x ^ conP,(a;) for all x G -X" implies
"
that X ^ Pj(x) for all X G X, i.e., P- is irreflexive Of course the same
conclusion can be obtained for the selfish preference correspondence P^.
Assumption (4.3) is a quite weak form of continuity. In fact, if P,- has a
r-open graph m X X X then both sections (upper and lower) are r-open.
Notice that, (4.3) implies [see Yannelis-Prabhakar (1983, Proposition 4.1,
p. 237)] that P- is r-lower semicontinuous, i.e., the set {x £ X : P,(a:)
y ^ 0} is r-open in X for every r-open subset V of X.
Finally, since any competitive equilibrium allocation is in the selfish
core and obviously in the extreme core it is of interest to know whether or
not under the assumptions of either Theorems 4.1 or 4.2 or Corollary 4.1
there exists a competitive equilibrium. However, the example of Mas-
ColeU (1986), indicates that under the assumptions of either Theorems 4.1
or 4.2 or Corollary 4.1 one should not even expect quasi-equihbria to exist.
It is important to note that in a finite dimensional commodity space
if one consumer has a concave, monotone, continuous utility function,
strictly positive initial endowments and his/her consumption set is com-
pact, there is always an equilibrium and a fortiori the core is nonempty.
Contrary to the finite dimensional commodity setting, in an infinite di-
mensional commodity framework, Mas-Colell's example shows that one
should not even expect a qua^i equilibrium to exist. Therefore, Theo-
rems 4.1, 4.2 and Corollary 4.1 provide existence core results for economies
in which quasi equilibria may not exist.
4.7 Concrete Spaces. In Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 the commodity
space L wa^ assumed to be any ordered Hausdorff linear topological space
endowed with the compatible topology r. However, in concrete spaces the
topology r will vary according to the underlying ordered Hausdorflf linear
topological space L. For instance if the commodity space is the Lebesgue
space Xp, 1 < p < CO the compatible topology wiU be the weak topology.
This follows from the fact that the spaces L^, I < p < oo are normed
vector lattices with order continuous norm, i.e., order intervals are weakly
compact [see Aliprantis and Burkinshaw (1985, Theorem 12.9) or Schae-
fer (1974, Theorem 6.6, p. 100 and Example 6, p. 92)]. If the commodity
space is L^ or i^ the compatible topology wiU be the weak* topology.
Recall that Alaoglou's theorem implies that order intervals are weak*
ifF
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compact [see Aliprantis and Burkinshaw (1985, Theorem 9.20)]. Finally,
if the commodity space is the space of real sequences i^, 1 < p < oo the
compatible topology will be the norm topology. This follows from the
standard result that order intervals in £
,
1 < p < oo are norm compact
[see for instance Yannelis and Zame (1984, Theorem 10.1, p. 48)].
It may be instructive to compare our continuity assumption (4.3)
with that of Araujo (1985) [or Beminghaus (1977)] whose commodity
space is i^ (or L^)^ with consumption sets X = i'^ (or L'^).
In Araujo (1985), preferences are given by a weak preference relation
^ which is reflexive, transitive, complete. Assume that >3 satisfies:
(i) the set {j/ G X : 7/ ^ x) is Mackey closed in X and convex for each
X e X,
(ii) the set {x £ X : y '^ x) is norm closed in X for each y ^ X
.
If we let P be the strict preference relation induced by ^, then
P{x) = X\{yeX:xyy} and P-'{y) = {x e X : y e P{x)} =
X \ {x ^ X : X '>^ y}. Therefore, for each x £ X , P{x) is norm open in
X and for each y E: X , P~^{y) is Mackey open in X . However, since by
the Mackey-Arens Theorem [see for instance Bewley (1972, p. 352, (8))]
the Mackey topology coincides with the weak* topology on closed convex
sets, it follows that the set {?/ E X : t/ ^ a:} is weak* closed in X and
consequently P~^(y) is weak* open in X . Therefore, since in L^ (or i^)
the compatible topology is the weak* topology, the continuity assump-
tion (4.3) in Theorem 4.1, for L = L^ is not stronger than the ones
of Araujo's (1985) (or Berninghaus' (1977)) continuity assumptions, who
require that the set {y G X : y >3 x} is Mackey (weak*) closed in X for
every x £ X . Hence, Theorem 4.1 can be considered a^ a generalization
of the existence results of Araujo (1985) and Berninghaus (1977). Specifi-
cally, the commodity space can be any arbitrary ordered linear topological
space and preferences need not be transitive, complete or convex and may
be interdependent.
5. Proof of the Theorems
5.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1. Suppose otherwise, i.e., Q^i^)
0, then for all x G i^ either
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(5.1) there exists y G F such that y G Pi{x) for all i, or
(5.2) for at least one agent i, e G -Pj(a^)-
For each i E I define ^^ : X —» 2-^ by V't(^) = conP,(x). Since by
assumption (4.3) P^ has r-open lower sections it follows from Lemma 5.1
in Yannelis ajid Prabhakar (1983, p. 239), that ip- has r-open lower sec-
tions in X. Let ip^,p be the restriction of ip^ to F. It follows from (5.1)
that:
(5.3) for all X € i^ there exists y £ F such that y G Pi{x) C con P,(a;) =
V't|F(^) ^^^ aU i G /.
For each i G / define $• : F ^ 2^ by $,(a:) = V'ijFC^^) (^ ^- Define
A = {w £ F : there exist z E F such that z G Pii^) for all z G /}. It can
be easily checked that A is open in F. It follows from (5.3) that:
(5.4) for all re G A, ^{{x) is nonempty for aU i G /.
Notice that from assumption (4.2) we have that x ^ con $,(x) =
$,(x) for all X G i^. Moreover, it can be easily seen that $,- has r-open
lower sections in F, i.e., $j is of class -C. For x G F, let 5^ = {i G / : e G
P,(x). It follows from (5.2) that
(5.5) for aU X G F and all i G S^, $,(x) ^ 0.
Indeed, from (5.2) we can conclude that for all x G -F and all f G 5^,
e G Pi{x) C conP,(x) = V'iiFC^)- Consequently, for all x G P and all
i es^.ee $.(x).
Define the correspondence 6 : F -^ 2^ hy
It follows from (5.4) and (5.5) that
(5.6) for all X G F, ^(x) / 0.
Notice that F is nonempty, convex, bounded and r-closed. Moreover,
F lies on the order interval [0,//e]^ = {x G X : < x^- < Ne for all
j G /} which is r-compact. Therefore, F is a r-compact subset of X. If
we show that 6 is jC-majorized we can then appeal to CoroUaxy 3.1. To
this end let x £ F. Then either (a) x G A, or (b) x G F \ A. If (a) holds
then ^(x) = C\i^j^i{x) ^ 0. Choose w G ^(x). Then w G ^^(x) for all i.
Fix an agent j in /. Since A is an open set in F, and ^j has r-open lower
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Isections in F, then{ej= Cli^j^iiz) C ^j{z) for all 2 6 A^U (b) holds
then e{x) = flies, ^t(^) ^ 0- Choose e G ^(x). Then e G $,(3:) for all
i G ^j. which implies that e G -^,(2:) for all i G S^. Fix an agent j in S^..
Since P- has r-open lower sections in F there exists a neighborhood of x,
N^ such that e G Pj(2:) for all 2: G iV^. But then j G 5, for all z G N^.
Consequently, e{z) = fl.es, ^t(-2^) C $j(^) for all z G N^. Therefore, 9 is
<C-majorized, By Corollary 3.1 there exists x* £ F such that 0(x*) = 0,
a contradiction to (5.6). Since we have obtained a contradiction to our
supposition that Cg(£) = the proof of the Theorem is complete.
5.2 Proof of Theorem 4.2. Let J be the set of all finite
dimensional subspaces of L containing the initial endowments. For each
f ^ 3^ and for each i G / define the consumption set Xf and the preference
correspondence P/ : X/ —> 2^« by
x/ = X. n /
P/{xi) = P,{x,)nf.
We now have an economy 8,-^ = {(X/, P/, ej : z = 1, . .
.
, TV}, in a
finite dimensional commodity space. It can be checked that each economy
£-^ satisfies all the conditions of Border's Proposition (1984, p. 1540),
and consequently for each / G ^, Qg{8,^) ^ 0, i.e., there exists x^ =
(xf , . .
.
,
xj^) in n,G/ ^x such that:
(5-7) Y^iei^l = E.-6/ei,and
(5.8) it is not true that there exist S C I and (yj),e5 ^ Iltes^t such
that E.es^f = EiGS^t ^-nd y,- G P/i^i) for all i G 5.
From (5.7) it follows that for each / G 3^
< ^x/ = ^e- = e < iVe.
Hence for each / G 3" the vectors xf lie on the order interval [0, Ne],
which is r-compact. Direct the set 3" by inclusion so that {(x(, . .
.
, xj^) :
f G 3^} forms a net in LxLx- • -xL. Since all the vectors x{ belong to the
order interval [0, A'^e] which is r-compact, the net {{x(, . .
.
, xj^) : / G 3"}
has a subnet which converges in the compatible topology r, to some vector
xl,. . . ,x*j^ in [0, A^e]. We must show that xj",. .. ^x]^ is a core allocation
for the economy £.
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Denote the convergent subnet by {{x{^^,...,xj^^') : m G M} g
where M is a set directed by ">." First of all we know that ^j^j x{^"^' = '
^jg^e,- for aU m
€
M. Since the vectors x^^' converge to x* in the
compatible topology r, and r is a vector space topology we conclude that
^i^jX* = Yliei^i^ ^•®*' ^* ~ (^1' • • • '^n) ^^ ^ feasible allocation for the
economy £. To complete the proof we must show that:
(5.9) it is not true that there exist S C I and (yj.-gs E Yiies-^i such
that
^i^sVi = Ei€S^f ^nd 2/,- G Piix*) for all i G 5.
Suppose otherwise, i.e., there exist S C I and (yjj^s G Htes-^t
such that ^,-^5 ^j = X^ies^t ^^^ J/i ^ ^ii^i) ^^^ ^ ^ ^ "^^ Since x{^"^'
converges to x* in the compatible topology r and by assumption (4.6) Pj
hcis a r-open graph, there exists m-^ £ M such that y^ G Pii^i ) for all
?n > mj and all i G 5. Choose mj > mj so that, if m > mj, y,- G X/
for all t G S. Then t/- G P/^'^\x{^'^^) for all m > m2, all i G 5, and
clearly X^tg5y,- = Yli^s^i- -^^^ ^^^^ contradicts the fact that x^^^^ is a
core allocation of the economy 8,^^^K Hence (5.9) is satisfied and this
completes the proof of the theorem.
5.3 Proof of Corollary 4.1. It follows from assumption (4.7)
that the set of all feasible allocations F is compact. Therefore, an identical
argument with that used in Theorem 4.1 can be adopted to complete the
proof of the Corollary.
6. Examples
We can now turn to some known pathological examples in the lit-
erature and see what goes wrong in infinite dimensions. In particular,
Araujo (1985), Mas-Colell (1986) and Jones (1984) illustrated by means
of simple examples the difficulties in obtaining existence of extreme core
allocations in an infinite dimensional commodity setting. The following
simple example due to Jones (1984) may be used to illustrate these diffi-
culties.
Example 6.1. Consider an economy with two agents, i.e., I = {1,2}.
The commodity space is L = C[0, 1], i.e., the space of continuous func-
tions on the interval [0, 1] under the supnorm. The consumption sets
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are X-^ = X2 = C[0, l]"*", i.e., the positive cone o/C[0,l]. Their utility
functions and their initial endowments are given as follows:
Wj(x) = / tx{i) dt,
Jo
u^ix) = / (1 -t)x{t)dt,
Jo
and .
_
1
ei - ^2 - 2-
Notice that utility functions are norm continuous, concave, and mono-
tone. However, there is no individually rational Pareto optimal allocation,
i.e., the extreme core which coincides with the selfish core is empty. (Of
course there are two Pareto optimal allocations which are not individually
rational, i.e., give aJl the initial endowment to either agent 1 or agent 2.)
The non-existence of extreme core allocations lies on the fact that the set
of all feasible allocations (which is norm closed and bounded) is not norm
compact (notice that consumption sets are not norm compact). Thus,
the proofs of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 or Corollary 4.1 do not go through.
The same difficulty occurs in the Araujo-Mas-Colell example [see for in-
stance Araujo (1974, Theorem 3)]. In particular there are two agents
whose preferences are norm continuous monotone convex but consump-
tion sets are not norm compact. Hence, the above examples have violated
assumption (4.7) of Corollary 4.1 and assumptions (4.3) and (4.6) of The-
orems 4.1 and 4.2 respectively. Consequently, the conclusion to be drawn
is that if the set of all feasible allocations is compact in a topology which
is at least a^ strong as the topology in which preferences are continuous,
then extreme a-core allocations always exist.
The intuition behind the above conclusion is quite simple. In par-
ticular, the maximal elements result (Theorem 3.3) is used to prove the
existence of extreme a-core allocations (Theorem 4.1). However, if in
Theorem 3.3 the preference correspondence P : X ^^ 2^ has open lower
sections in a topology which is stronger than the topology in which the
set X is compact, then Theorem 3.3 fails and a fortiori Corollary 3.1 fails
a^ well. The following example illustrates this.
17
Example 6.2. Let Y be a Banach space. Denote by \\ ' \\ the norm on
Y. Let X. be equal to the set {x £ Y* : \\x\\ < 1}. Notice that by the
Alaoglou theorem [see Aliprantis and Burkinshaw (1985, Theorem 9.20)]
X is weak* compact, and it is obviously convex and nonempty. Let f :
X —* X be a norm continuous mapping which does not have the fixed
point property, i.e., x ^ f{x) for any x ^ X. Let 5((/(x), H^~^>^^ll )
be an open ball in Y centered at f{x) with radius ll£::Ii£lli, Define the
preference correspondence P : X ^ 2^ by P{x) = 5(/(x), -1^^^^^^^ ) nX
.
It can be easily checked that P has norm open lower sections, is convex
valued and irreflexive, i.e., P is of class >C and consequently H -majorized.
Notice, that for all x E X, f{x) 6 P{x), i-^-, P has no maximal element
in X.
7. Remarks
Remark 7.1. A careful examination of Theorem 4.1 shows that its
proof remains unaffected if the set of agents / is any countable set, pro-
vided that we assume that the aggregate initial endowment is finite.
Remark 7.2. Theorem 4.2 can be extended in a straightforward man-
ner to coalition production economies as in the Border (1984) framework.
One needs to impose in addition to balanced technology [see for instance
Border (1984)], the standard assumptions on the production side of the
economy, which guarantee that the set of all feasible allocations is com-
pact in the compatible topology. The proof of Theorem 4.2 remains es-
sentially unchanged.
Remark 7.3. Ichiichi and Schaffer (1983) have obtained core existence
results, for games in characteristic function form, with a measure space of
agents, and with a strategy space which is L^. Although our framework
is entirely different than theirs, it is still of interest to know whether
Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 can be extended to a measure space of agents. It
seems to us that there are serious technical difficulties.
Remark 7.4. Recently the work of Kim and Richter (1986) in con-
sumer and equilibrium theory showed that the strict preference relations
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which need not be transitive or complete can be replaced by weak pref-
erence relations which need not be transitive or complete. Using their
methods one can obtain core existence results for weak preference rela-
tions which need not be transitive or complete.
Remark 7.5. A rather more natural definition of the core with inter-
dependent preferences is what Aumann (1964) calls strong equilibrium.
One may define a strong equilibrium allocation of 8, = {(X,-, P,-, e,) : i G /}
as a vector x = (xj, . .
.
, x^^^)
€
X such that
(i) X is feasible, and
(ii) it is not true that there exist S C I and (y,)ies Flies ^« ^^^^ ^^^^
for all i E S.
However, Scarf (1967, p. 180) showed that even with stronger conditions
than those used in Theorem 4,2, the (3-coTe (recall that the set of strong
equilibrium allocations is a subset of the /?-core) may be empty and there-
fore the set of strong equilibrium allocations may be empty as well.
Appendix
Fan's (1962) extension of the K-K-M Lemma to HausdorfF linear
topological spaces was based on the finite dimensional K-K-M result.
This way of proving an infinite dimensional result by considering its trace
on finite dimensions, sometimes simplifies the arguments considerably.
Indeed this method of proof was adopted by Fan (1952) to extend the
Kakutani fixed point to Hausdorff locally convex linear topological spaces.
We now provide an alternative proof of the K-K-M-F theorem which is
similar in spirit with that of Fan but makes use of the Brouwer fixed point
theorem. In addition to the fact that our proof is very intuitive it turns
out to be elementary. Notice that in finite dimensions the Brouwer fixed
point can be used to derive the K-K-M theorem,^ the Sperner Lemma
and the Kakutani fixed point theorem. In that sense Brouwer's result
may be considered a^ a milestone in Fixed Point Theory.
A proof that the Brouwer fixed point theorem implies the K-K-M Lemma
is R' is given by Ichiichi (1981a) who attributes the argument to K. C. Border
and E. Green. Although our proof is more involved than that in Ichiichi (1981)
the idea is essentially the same.
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Proof of Theorem 3.1. It suffices to prove that 0?=! -^(^t) t^
for every finite subset {xj,...,x„} of X. Suppose otherwise; i.e.,
P|"_j -F(x,) = for some finite subset {xj,...,a;^} of X. Let A be the
simplex spanned by the finite set {xj ,...,!„}. Since the topology induced
on any finite dimensional subspace by the topology of Y is equivalent to
the Euclidean topology, A is homeomorphic to a Euclidean ball [Kelley
and Namioka (1963, Theory 7.3, p. 49)]. Denote by d the Euclidean met-
ric in the finite dimensional subspace spanned by {xj, . . . ,x„}. Define
^ : A -* 2^ by V(a:) = {y G A : x ^ ^{y)}- Then for each x 6 A,
tp{x) 7^ 0. Indeed at least one x,-, (1 < z < n) is in ip(x), for otherwise
X G nr=i -^(^t)- For each y G A let ip~'^{y) = {x G A : ?/ G t/>(a:)} =
A \ {x G A : X G F{y)}. Since {x G A : x G F{y)} = A fl F{y)
is closed in A, the set i^~^{y) is open in A for each y G A. De-
fine 4> : A -^ 2^ = conV'Ca:). Then </> is convex and nonempty val-
ued. Moreover, 4> has open lower sections in A [Yannelis and Prab-
hakar (1983, Lemma 5.1)]. Nonempty valueness of </> implies that for
every x G A there is a y G A such that x G <t>~^{y). Hence, the collection
{^~^{y) '• y G A} is an open cover of A. But A compact implies that
there exists a finite set of points {y^, . . . ,y^} such that A C lj"_i <^~^(t/,).
Define a,- : A -^ R^ by a^ix) = d{x,A \ <j>~'^{y,)), I < i < n. Set
yj(x) = (Q!i(a:))/(X)j=i ^ji^)) for all x G A, 1 < z < n. Then, g^ix) =
for X ^ <^~^(j/,), < 5,(x) < 1 and Y^^=igiix) = 1 for all x G A. Define
/ : A —>• A by /(x) = Yl^-i gi{x)y^. Clearly / is continuous and for each
i such that 5',(x) 7^ 0, x G 4>~^{yi) or y^ G </>(a:). Hence, /(x) is a convex
combination of points y- in the convex set 0(x) and so /(x) G <;^(x) for
all X G A. By Brouwer's fixed point theorem there exists x* G A such
that X* = /(x*) G <p(x*) = con^(x*). But x* G con'0(a^*) implies that
there exist points y^, . . . , y^ in A and real numbers a^, . . . , a^, a > 0,
{I < j < m), Xl^i ^j — 1 such that x* = X)jLi S'2/j ^^^ ^i ^ ^^(2^*) for
all j. But y G i^ix*) implies that x* ^ F(yj) for all j, a contradiction to
assumption (i). Therefore nr=i ^(^i) / ^' ^^id this completes the proof.
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